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BALDRIDGE V. BOARD OF TRUSTEES: A CASE
FOR REFORM OF MONTANA'S TENURED
TEACHER DISMISSAL PROCESS
Michelle Bryan*
I. INTRODUCTION
Montana's public school system is having a teacher crisis.
Largely due to low-salary offerings,1 numerous school districts
are unable to recruit and retain qualified new educators. 2
Moreover, presently employed teachers describe themselves as
"underpaid, unappreciated, disenchanted and burning out."3
Parents meanwhile persist in their demands for more numerous,
increasingly qualified teachers. 4 Acknowledging the pandemic
teacher deficits and chronic underfunding within Montana's
education system, commentators are urging schools to creatively
market teaching positions to compensate for low wages.5
Central to this statewide hiring push is the concept of
teacher tenure.6 With its promise of job security, tenure can
* The author wishes to specially recognize Donna Miller for her enduring instruction on
writing, John J. Mudd for his resolute encouragement; Phillip A. White for his ever-wise
counsel; and Lisa Roberts and the Montana Law Review editors for their valuable
commentary during the development of this note.
1. Montana ranks forty-seventh nationwide in average public school teacher
salaries at $31,356. See National Education Association, Average Salaries of Public
School Teachers, 1998-1999 (visited April 1, 2000) <http:/www.nea.org/publiced/edstats/
salaries.html>; see also National Education Association, As Teacher Salaries Fall Behind
in the United States, NEA Expresses Concern Over Ability to Hire Newcomers (released
May 13, 1998) <httpJ/www.nea.org/nr/nr980513.html> (reporting that, when adjusted
for inflation, Montana teaching salaries have dropped 8.1% over the past decade).
Z See Erin P. Billings, Montana Schools Have Trouble Filling Teacher Positions,
MISSOULIAN, Jan. 14, 2000, at Al, A8; Peter Johnson, Teachers Harder to Find, Keep,
GREAT FALLS TRIB., Dec. 24, 1999, at 1A, 7A.
3. Ken Picard, Reading, Writing and Respect, MISSOULA INDEP., Mar. 2, 2000, at
15.
4. See Johnson, supra note 2, at 7A-
5. See Gary Moseman, Editorial, Schools Must Adjust in Response to Teacher
Shortage, GREAT FALLS TRIB., Dec. 24, 1999, at 6A, Johnson, supra note 2, at 7A.
6. While Montana and several other jurisdictions employ the term "tenured
teacher," there are many variations on the theme. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 16-24-8 (1999)
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serve as a valuable recruitment device in an otherwise low-
paying job market. Once a Montana teacher earns tenure, she
possesses the right to a perpetual salary and position in her
school district.7  The Montana Supreme Court has long
recognized the public policy benefits of tenure,8 describing it is
"a substantial, valuable, and beneficial right."9
Yet is Montana's tenure substantial enough to attract
prospective teachers? Despite tenure's laudable protections, a
teacher remains vulnerable to her school board's considerable
authority to dismiss her under Montana Code Annotated § 20-4-
203(4) (1999), which states: "Upon receiving tenure, the
employment of a teacher may be terminated for good cause."10
Understandably, Montana reposes this managerial
discretion in local school boards because of their intimate
familiarity with the needs of their particular school system."
Unfortunately, neither state statutes nor case law contain
guidelines for deciphering what constitutes "good cause" in the
(continuing service teacher); ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-17-1510 (Michie 1997)
(nonprobationary teacher); IND. CODE § 20-6.1-4-10 (1999) (permanent teacher); MAss.
GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 71, § 42 (West 1999) (professional teacher); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
122A.40 (West 1998) (continuing contract teacher); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-325 (1998)
(career teacher).
7. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-4-203(1) (1999) ("[Whenever a teacher has been
elected by the offer and acceptance of a contract for the fourth consecutive year of
employment by a district in a position requiring teacher certification .... the teacher is
considered to be reelected from year to year as a tenured teacher at the same salary and in
the same or a comparable position of employment as that provided by the last-executed
contract with the teacher .... .") (emphasis added).
8. See Beck v. Board of Trustees, 233 Mont. 319, 322, 760 P.2d 83, 85 (1988) ("Our
society has long since determined the desirability of teacher tenure and this state has
enacted legislation to implement it as a public policy.") (citing Sibert v. Community
College, 179 Mont. 188, 191, 587 P.2d 26, 28 (1978)).
9. Trustees v. Anderson, 232 Mont. 501, 505, 757 P.2d 1315, 1318 (1988); see also
Yanzick v. School Dist. No. 23, 196 Mont. 375, 391, 641 P.2d 431, 441(1982) (citing State
ex rel Saxtorph v. District Court (Fergus County), 128 Mont. 353, 361, 275 P.2d 209, 214
(1954)).
10. Montana law deems the demotion of a tenured teacher the equivalent of a
termination. See Smith v. School Dist. No. 18, 115 Mont. 102, 115, 139 P.2d 518, 523
(1943), overruled on other grounds by Massey v. Argenbright, 211 Mont. 331, 337, 683
P.2d 1332, 1335 (1984). This note deals solely with dismissals arising from alleged
teacher misconduct and does not touch upon other types of terminations such as school-
wide reductions in work force.
11. See Kelsey v. School Dist. No. 25, 84 Mont. 453, 455, 276 P. 26, 27 (1929) ("It is
for the board of education, within the reasonable exercise of its power and discretion, to
say what is best for the successful management and conduct of the schools . . .")
(quoting Wilson v. Board of Educ., 84 N.E. 697, 700 (IMI. 1908)). The Montana
Constitution embodies this tradition in its statement that "[tihe supervision and control
of schools in each school district shall be vested in a board of trustees .... " MONT.
CONST. art. X, § 8 (1972).
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context of teacher dismissals. 12  When outrageous teacher
misconduct occurs, common sense can be our guide.13 Yet
circumstances are rarely so crystalline. 14 Without articulated
guidelines for applying Montana's good cause statute, teacher
dismissals become inconsistent 15 and susceptible to abuses of
school board discretion. 16 This lack of guidance has created a
legacy of lengthy, expensive litigation between Montana
teachers and school districts battling over the propriety of
terminations.
Spanning a decade and costing over $500,000,17 the case of
Baldridge v. Board of Trustees18 (Baldridge II) underscores the
12. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-903(5) (1999) supplies a definition of "good cause" in
the wrongful discharge context, which essentially deems any "legitimate business
reason" a good cause for dismissal of an employee. Because Montana has a public policy
of providing its tenured teachers with a heightened level of job security, arguably "good
cause" for teacher dismissals must be a more rigorous standard than that associated
with the typical business enterprise. Indeed, the 1997 Montana Legislature expressly
rejected a proposed definition of "good cause" that included the "legitimate business
reason." See Hearings on H.B. 49 Before the House Educ. Comm., Exhibit 6 at 2, 55th
Leg. Sess. (Mont. 1997) (general minutes).
13. See, e.g., Rolando v. School Directors, 358 N.E.2d 945 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976)
(dismissing a teacher who disciplined his sixth grade students with electric shocks from
a cattle prod); Miller v. Grand Haven Bd. of Educ., 390 N.W.2d 255 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986)
(suspending a music teacher who repeatedly exposed himself to fifth- and sixth-grade
girls during individual lessons by dropping his trousers); Hamm v. Poplar Bluff R-1 Sch.
Dist., 955 S.W.2d 27 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (terminating a teacher when police found a 14-
year-old female student in the teacher's home after midnight and he answered the door
wearing only his boxer shorts).
14. See, e:g., Trustees v. Holden, 231 Mont. 491, 754 P.2d 506 (1988) (upholding a
county superintendent's conclusion that no good cause existed to dismiss a music teacher
who called one student a "slob" and told another student "move over, Goodyear [blimp],"
greatly upsetting those students); Yanzick v. School Dist. No. 23, 196 Mont. 375, 641
P.2d 431 (1982) (holding that good cause existed to dismiss a male middle school science
teacher for cohabiting with a female physical education teacher out of wedlock).
15. See, e.g., supra note 14. Note that in Holden a teacher who verbally insulted
his students remained employed, while in Yanzick a teacher lost his employment due to
private, non-classroom conduct.
16. See Yanzick, 196 Mont. at 404, 641 P.2d at 448 ("[U1n my opinion, the Court is
countenancing a 'witch hunt' in this case. The Court is condoning a legal determination
based upon rumor and hearsay. In doing so, the security of tenure has been dealt a
serious blow. The precedential effect will necessarily diminish academic freedom in
Montana.") (Morrison, J., registering a "vigorous" dissent).
17. See Hearings on H.B. 49 Before the House Educ. Comm., Exhibit 9A at 1, 55th
Leg. Sess. (Mont. 1997) (statement of Michael Dahlem, private attorney) (estimating
Rosebud County School District costs at that time to be $200,000). Coupled with
Baldridge's estimated expenses, the total costs for both parties have approached half a
million dollars. Interview with Elmer Baldridge, in Bozeman, Mont. (July 7, 1999).
18. 287 Mont. 53, 951 P.2d 1343 (1997) [hereinafter Baldridge Ill. This case was
before the Montana Supreme Court for its second time. The first decision was Baldridge
v. Board of Trustees, 264 Mont. 199, 870 P.2d 711 (1994) [hereinafter Baldridge 1]
(clarifying the standard of review for teacher dismissals). Additionally, the teacher's
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compelling need for articulated guidelines in Montana's tenured
teacher dismissal process. This note urges such reform, using
Baldridge II as a case study. Part II chronicles the story of high
school teacher Elmer Baldridge and his dismissal by Rosebud
County School District No. 19. This section further details the
procedural meandering of Baldridge II through the state court
system and the Montana Supreme Court's ultimate holding in
the case. Part III places Baldridge II in context by tracing the
legal evolution of tenured teacher dismissals in Montana. Part
IV critiques the supreme court's reasoning in Baldridge II, using
the decision to highlight the current inadequacies in Montana's
teacher dismissal process. Finally, Part V proffers suggestions
for mitigating these inadequacies by examining successful extra-
and intra-jurisdictional models. The note concludes that
Montana has the capacity to reform its tenured teacher
dismissal process to better safeguard the interests of both
teacher and school district - a step Montana must take to
competitively recruit and retain qualified new educators for its
school system.
II. THE BALDRIDGE II DECISION
A. Factual Summary
Elmer Baldridge (Baldridge) was a tenured science teacher
at Colstrip High School in Colstrip, Montana. 19 Spring of 1988
marked his fifth year of teaching.20 Both the school and
community regarded Baldridge as a dedicated teacher of
excellent repute.21  He was highly involved in student
extracurricular activities, including coaching several sports and
student plays.22 During his time at Colstrip High School,
union brought a concurrent action before the Montana Supreme Court, Colstrip Faculty
Assoc. v. Trustees, 251 Mont. 309, 824 P.2d 1008 (1992), compelling Rosebud County
School District No. 19 to undergo arbitration over alleged violations of its collective
bargaining agreement arising from Baldridge's termination.
19. See Appellant's Brief at 3-4, Baldridge II (No. 97-230) (contained in the
Montana Supreme Court record).
20. See id. at 43.
21. See Elmer Baldridge v. Board of Trustees, Acting County Superintendent's
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order at 5 (Finding of Fact No. 3) (Jan. 19,
1995) (unpublished opinion contained in the Montana Supreme Court record for
Baldridge II) [hereinafter County Superintendent's Order].
22. See In the Matter of the Arbitration Between Colstrip Faculty Assoc. v.
Colstrip Sch. Dist. No. 19 Re: Grievance of Elmer Baldridge, Opinion and Order at 9
(Eric B. Lindauer, Arbitrator) (Feb. 2, 1993) (unpublished opinion contained in the
254 Vol. 61
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Baldridge consistently earned the highest possible score on his
teaching evaluations. 23
In addition to his instructional duties, Baldridge chaired the
Colstrip Faculty Association, where he served as an outspoken
critic of school policies 24 and brought numerous grievances
against District Superintendent Harold Tokerud (Tokerud) and
the School District Board of Trustees (Board).25 In particular,
Baldridge challenged perceived discrimination against Native
American students at Colstrip High School. 26 Because of his
activism in school affairs, Baldridge was known to be a "thorn in
the side" of the school administration.27
In March of 1988, Baldridge's classroom conduct came
under fire. While seeking student assistance in washing dirty
laboratory glassware, Baldridge slipped a rubber glove on his
hand, held the hand up, and asked, "May I have a female
volunteer?"28 This "glove incident" prompted one student's
parents to write a complaint letter to the high school principal,
Eileen Pearce.29 Baldridge sent a formal apology to the parents
for making inappropriate comments that could be construed as
chauvinistic. 30  Principal Pearce then recommended that
Montana Supreme Court record for Baldridge II) [hereinafter Arbitrator's Opinion].
23. See County Superintendent's Order, supra note 21, at 5 (Findings of Fact Nos.
3-4). School administrators conducted these evaluations. Interview with Elmer
Baldridge, in Bozeman, Mont. (July 7, 1999).
24. See Arbitrator's Opinion, supra note 22, at 9.
25. See Appellant's Brief, supra note 19, at 5. Baldridge brought complaints before
both the Montana Human Rights Commission and the Montana Department of Labor on
behalf of teacher union members. Interview with Elmer Baldridge, in Bozeman, Mont.
(July 7, 1999). Baldridge prevailed in all fifteen grievances filed against the school
superintendent and the Board. See Arbitrator's Opinion, supra note 22, at 44.
26. See County Superintendent's Order, supra note 21, at 6 (Finding of Fact No. 5).
27. See id. (Finding of Fact No. 8).
28. See Baldridge II, 287 Mont. 53, 56, 951 P.2d 1343, 1345 (1997).
29. See id.; see also Letter from Patty and Bud Comer, parents of high school
student Tina Comer, to Principal Pearce (Apr. 11, 1988) (contained in the Montana
Supreme Court record for Baldridge II).
30. See County Superintendent's Order, supra note 21, at 10 (Finding of Fact No.
21). The record is unclear whether the parents objected to Baldridge's glove joke as a
chauvinistic stereotype of women being dishwashers or as a reference to gynecological
examinations. After a meeting with Principal Pearce, however, Baldridge drafted his
written apology for making remarks that stereotyped women. See id. (Findings of Fact
Nos. 19-21). Principal Pearce reviewed the apology before its transmittal to the parents.
See Elmer Baldridge v. Board of Trustees, Transcript of Proceedings before Acting
County Superintendent of Schools, Rosebud County at 128 (May 30, 1989) [hereinafter
Transcript] (testimony of Principal Eileen Pearce). As a whole, these circumstances
imply that the parties initially perceived the glove joke as a sexist stereotype versus a
sexual innuendo.
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Tokerud suspend Baldridge with pay pending a formal
investigation.31  The investigation unearthed additional
allegations of past misconduct as follows:
1. Baldridge used the expression "stop, drop, and blow" in
response to a student who was badgering him for a time
extension on a late homework assignment.
2. Baldridge told a student he would give him twenty
bucks to make another kid cry.
3. Baldridge told a joke containing the word "testes."
4. Baldridge used the expression, "You guys might think
I'm a little __," accompanied by a pricking motion to
his finger.
5. Baldridge showed his middle finger to some students.
6. In response to a female student who remarked that she
could not "stand the sight of blood," Baldridge quipped,
"iSihe must have had a rough month."32
Upon conclusion of the investigation, Tokerud recommended
to the Board that it discharge Baldridge from his teaching
position.33  Following a public hearing on these alleged
incidents, the Board unanimously voted to terminate Baldridge
for "incompetence, unfitness, and violation of Board policies."34
Numerous students and faculty staged a walkout during school
hours to protest the Board's actions.35 Local media and a
Billings television station covered the demonstration. 36
Challenging his dismissal, Baldridge embarked on a "tortured
procedural path"37 that would take a decade to resolve.38
31. See Baldridge H, 287 Mont. at 56, 951 P.2d at 1345. The district retained Paul
Stengel, a retired school administrator from Miles City, to conduct the investigation. See
Arbitrator's Opinion, supra note 22, at 11.
32. Baldridge H, 287 Mont. at 59-60, 951 P.2d at 1347.
33. See Arbitrator's Opinion, supra note 22, at 8.
34. Baldridge H, 287 Mont. 53, 56, 951 P.2d 1343, 1345 (1997). The Board did not
specify its grounds for dismissal at the hearing, but set them forth in a subsequent letter
to Baldridge. Interview with Elmer Baldridge, in Bozeman, Mont. (July 7, 1999). These
grounds were three of four express statutory grounds authorized under the then-existing
MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-4-207(1) (1987), which empowered school districts to dismiss a
teacher for "immorality, unfitness, incompetence, or violation of the adopted policies" of
the district. See discussion infra Part III.B (detailing the historical development of this
statute).
35. See Transcript, supra note 30, at 135-36 (testimony of Principal Eileen Pearce).
36. See Arbitrator's Opinion, supra note 22, at 11.
37. Baldridge II, 287 Mont. at 55, 951 P.2d at 1344.
38. Baldridge would argue that his case remains unresolved, since he is presently
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B. Procedural Summary
1. Baldridge I - The First Appeal
Baldridge first filed his appeal with the Rosebud County
Superintendent of Schools (county superintendent). 39 After a
May 1989 hearing, the county superintendent issued an order
reinstating Baldridge, concluding that the Board had failed to
prove any of the statutory grounds for good cause.40 The Board
appealed this decision to the State Superintendent of Public
Instruction (state superintendent), who ultimately reversed the
county superintendent for erring in her conclusion "that
Baldridge's conduct did not constitute unfitness ....- 41
Baldridge next carried his challenge to the Thirteenth
Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, which affirmed the
state superintendent. 42 On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court
clarified the standards of review applicable to the various
appellate levels,43 and sent the case back to the county
superintendent for additional findings of fact.4 '
contesting the permanent revocation of his teaching certificate by the State
Superintendent of Public Instruction. Interview with Elmer Baldridge, in Bozeman,
Mont. (July 7, 1999); see also In the Matter of the Denial of the Renewal of the Teaching
Certificate of Elmer Baldridge, Decision and Order on Summary Judgment Motions at 1
(No. 2-1998) (Montana Board of Public Education) (Oct. 23, 1998). Prior to the Baldridge
II decision, the state superintendent had continually renewed Baldridge's teaching
certificate. After the decision, the state superintendent revoked Baldridge's certificate
based upon "the Montana Supreme Court's ruling that [Baldridge was] incompetent to
teach as a matter of law." Letter from Nancy Keenan, State Superintendent of Public
Instruction, to Elmer R. Baldridge (Jan. 28, 1998) (contained in the Montana Supreme
Court record for Baldridge II).
39. See County Superintendent's Order, supra note 21, at 2-3. For reasons not
expressed in the record, the Board disqualified Jean Nolan (Nolan), the Rosebud County
Superintendent of Schools from hearing Baldridge's appeal. Nolan then appointed
Shirley Barrick, Fergus County Superintendent of Schools, to be the acting county
superintendent for these proceedings. See id. at 2.
40. See id. at 28; see also discussion infra Parts III.B-C (articulating the applicable
dismissal grounds and requisite burden of proof).
41. Baldridge II, 287 Mont. 53, 61, 951 P.2d 1343, 1348 (1997) (reversing on second
review, the first review resulting in a remand for further findings of fact).
42. See id.
43. See discussion infra Part III.E (setting forth the standards of review).
44. See Baldridge 1, 264 Mont. 199, 211-12, 870 P.2d 711, 718-19 (1994). Upon
clarifying the standards, the supreme court "remanded to the district court with
instructions to remand to the State Superintendent for remand to the acting county
superintendent of schools .... " Baldridge II, 287 Mont. at 55, 951 P.2d at 1344-45.
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2. Baldridge 11 - The Second Appeal
In 1995, the county superintendent issued a second order
reinstating Baldridge based on her continued assessment that
the Board failed to prove good cause for dismissal.45 In weighing
the evidence, she noted that the students testifying against
Baldridge lacked credibility because of their demeanors while
testifying, membership in a clique, 46 and status as children of
school administrators. 47  Her holding also emphasized the
longstanding animosity between Baldridge and school
administrators,4" and the Board's conspicuous failure to notify
Baldridge of his past misconduct at the time it occurred.49
In light of these background circumstances, the county
superintendent made the following factual findings:
a. The Glove Incident
The Board construed Baldridge's glove comment as a
reference to a gynecological exam.50 Baldridge, however, did not
intend the comment to be sexually derogatory.5' Rather, he
made a joke meant to highlight male chauvinism and the
stereotypical notion of dish washing as women's work.52 Indeed,
the parents' complaint interpreted the joke as chauvinistic
versus sexual in nature.5 3  After receiving the complaint,
Baldridge immediately wrote a letter of apology. 54 There was no
adverse impact on the students due to this incident. 55
b. Stop, Drop, and Blow Incident
"Stop, drop, and blow" was shorthand for "Stop arguing, drop
the subject, and blow this pop stand."56 This was a common
45. See County Superintendent's Order, supra note 21, at 31.
46. See id. at 29 (Conclusion of Law No. 29).
47. See id. at 13, 29 (Finding of Fact No. 27, Conclusion of Law No. 29) (noting that
one student "does not have a very good reputation for any truth or veracity at all" and
that the students "belonged to a clique").
48. See id. at 6 (Finding of Fact No. 8).
49. See id. at 28 (Conclusion of Law No. 25).
50. See id. at 10 (Finding of Fact No. 20).
51. See County Superintendent's Order, supra note 21, at 8 (Finding of Fact No.
15).
52. See id. at 9 (Finding of Fact No. 17).
53. See id. at 10 (Finding of Fact No. 19).
54. See id. at 10 (Findings of Fact No. 21).
55. See id. at 9 (Finding of Fact No. 17).
56. See id. at 11 (Finding of Fact No. 22).
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expression Baldridge used to enforce his policy of turning in
homework on time.57 There was no offensive meaning attached
to these words.58
c. Twenty Bucks Incident
Students viewed the "twenty bucks" statement as a joke.59
Baldridge did not seriously wish physical harm to any student.6°
d. Testes Joke
The testes joke involved the story of a teacher who wanted
to ease student anxiety over quizzes, so he would call them
"little quizzies." Supposedly, a girl then retorted, "If this is a
quizzie, I want to see one of your testes."61 The joke was
innocuous and did not offend any students.62 In addition to
Baldridge, two other teachers told this same joke at school.63
Those teachers received no reprimand."4
e. Finger Pricking Incident
Students did not attach a phallic reference to Baldridge's
comments.65 Rather, students interpreted the motion as an
"irritation" - like a needle prick.66 No students were offended.67
f Flipping Off Incident
Baldridge made this gesture without the classic
connotation. 6 Although such behavior was inappropriate, it
was neither intended nor perceived as offensive. 69
57. See County Superintendent's Order, supra note 21, at 11 (Finding of Fact No.
23).
58. See id. at 12 (Finding of Fact No. 23).
59. See id. at 12 (Finding of Fact No. 24).
60. See id.
61. Respondent's Brief at 13, Baldridge I (No. 97-230).
62. See County Superintendent's Order, supra note 21, at 13 (Finding of Fact No.
25).
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See id. at 14 (Finding of Fact No. 28).
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See County Superintendent's Order, supra note 21, at 15 (Finding of Fact No.
29).
69. See id.
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g. Time of Month Incident
Baldridge made an honest slip-of-the-tongue with his
comment about a female student having "a rough month."70
Recognizing the potential for misunderstanding, he immediately
apologized to the studentJ 1 The student was embarrassed, but
found his apology sincere.7 2 The incident had no lasting adverse
impact on Baldridge's relationship with his students.73
Based upon these findings, the county superintendent
reiterated her conclusion that the Board "failed to establish
sufficient evidence.., to support a dismissal for incompetency,
unfitness, [or] violation of board policies, individually or
cumulatively."74  This case again visited the state
superintendent and district court, with both levels reversing the
county superintendent.7 5 In 1997, Baldridge presented his case
to the Montana Supreme Court for a second time.
C. The Montana Supreme Court's Holding
1. The Majority Opinion - Unfitness as a Matter of Law
Writing for the majority, Justice Gray first reiterated the
Baldridge I holding regarding the standards for reviewing a
county superintendent's order: findings of fact are reversible
only when clearly erroneous, whereas conclusions of law are
reversible if incorrect.7 6  Determining that the county
superintendent's factual findings were undisputed,77 the court
then turned to the county superintendent's conclusions of law.
The court determined that the county superintendent
incorrectly applied the good cause dismissal statute78 to the
70. See id. at 16 (Finding of Fact No. 30).
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See County Superintendent's Order, supra note 21, at 28 (Conclusion of Law
No. 26).
75. The state superintendent again held that the county superintendent erred in
concluding that Baldridge was fit to teach, and the District Court affirmed that
determination. See Baldridge II, 287 Mont. 53, 61, 951 P.2d 1343, 1348 (1997).
76. See id. at 58, 951 P.2d at 1346; see also discussion infra Part III.E (explaining
further the applicable standards of review).
77. See id.
78. See discussion infra Part III.B (setting forth the four-factor dismissal statute in
place at the time of Baldridge's dismissal).
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facts, holding that "[a] teacher who makes jokes about testes
and student's menstrual periods, flips off his students... and
makes gender-based remarks and innuendoes in his classroom is
unfit to continue teaching as a matter of law."79 Additionally,
the court reasoned that because of Baldridge's per se unfitness,
his benign intentions and the students' lack of offense to his
comments were irrelevant to the inquiry of proper dismissal.80
Deeming Baldridge's behavior "inappropriate on its face,"8' the
court ruled that the only correct legal conclusion was to uphold
termination.82
2. The Dissenting Opinion - Deference to the Fact Finder
Justice Trieweiler, joined by Justice Hunt, issued a strong
dissent.83 The dissent argued that the court should extend
greater deference to the county superintendent's judgment, since
she was in the best position to assess Baldridge's fitness to
teach.84  Emphasizing the context surrounding Baldridge's
conduct, the dissent found the following factors dispositive: the
lack of credibility of the students testifying against Baldridge;85
Baldridge's consistently high ratings on teaching evaluations by
school administration;8 6 Baldridge's rapport with students and
teachers;87 the school district's failure to apprize Baldridge of his
alleged misconduct and allow opportunity for remediation;88 the
79. Baldridge 11, 287 Mont. at 60, 951 P.2d at 1347-48 (emphasis added); see also
discussion infra Part IV.C (explaining how "as a matter of law" is the functional
equivalent of unfitness per se).
80. See Baldridge 11, 287 Mont. at 61, 951 P.2d at 1348 ("Mhe propriety of a
teacher's conduct cannot be evaluated by viewing it through the eyes of the very
teenagers the teacher has a duty to educate and to guide.").
81. Baldridge II, 287 Mont. 53, 61, 951 P.2d 1343, 1348 (1997).
82. See id.
83. See id. at 63, 951 P.2d at 1349 (Trieweiler, J., dissenting).
84. See id. at 67, 951 P.2d at 1352 (noting that the county superintendent
conducted the actual hearing and was able to "listen[] to the witnesses, including the
teacher involved") (Trieweiler, J., dissenting). Contrast this with the supreme court's
more distant perspective of the case, which was limited to the record.
85. See id. at 63, 951 P.2d at 1349 ("Mhe witnesses against Baldridge belonged to
a clique directly related to a school board member involved in efforts to discharge
Baldridge and... their credibility was suspect.") (Trieweiler, J., dissenting).
86. See id. at 64, 951 P.2d at 1350 (Trieweiler, J., dissenting).
87. See Baldridge 11, 287 Mont. 53, 64, 951 P.2d 1343, 1350 (1997) (Trieweiler, J.,
dissenting).
8& See id. at 67, 951 P.2d at 1352 ("Mhose incidents could have been prevented
by a warning.., and termination of an admirable career in teaching was unnecessary.")
(Trieweiler, J., dissenting).
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nonharmful impact upon Baldridge's students; 9 the school
administration's ulterior motive to silence Baldridge's
activism;9° and the Board's inability to show that Baldridge's
alleged misconduct reduced his effectiveness as a teacher.91
In light of all the factual support in the record, the dissent
judged the county superintendent's legal conclusions to be
correct. 92 This deferential approach is consistent with the
supreme court's historic exercise of judicial restraint from
disrupting a county superintendent's determinations. 93
III. BACKGROUND OF TEACHER DISMISSALS IN MONTANA
In Montana, tenured teacher dismissals have never been
simple. Case law tells the stories of judicial struggles to define
dismissal grounds and teacher appeals that wandered the courts
for years.94  Moreover, the lack of statutory and judicial
guidelines has rendered the process inherently subjective.95
School districts are left to rely on their "wide discretion" and
"sound judgment."96 The result has been a patchwork of fact-
specific rulings that fail to articulate uniform guidelines for
teacher dismissals.
A. The Public Policy Behind Teacher Tenure
The Montana Legislature first granted tenure rights to
public school teachers in 1913. 97 This grant was part of a
89. See id. at 66-67, 951 P.2d 1351-52 (Trieweiler, J., dissenting).
90. See id. at 67, 951 P.2d 1352 ("Baldridge's politics and relationship with the
[District) Superintendent were the more likely basis for his termination than any of the
incidents complained of.") (Trieweiler, J., dissenting).
91. See id. at 65, 951 P.2d at 1350 (Trieweiler, J., dissenting).
92. See id. at 67, 951 P.2d at 1352 (Trieweiler, J., dissenting).
93. See discussion infra Part III.A (discussing deferential review of the fact finder).
94. See, e.g., Baldridge II, 287 Mont. 53, 55, 951 P.2d 1343, 1344 (1997) (terming
Baldridge's dismissal appeal process a "tortured procedural path"); Yanzick v. School
Dist. No. 23, 196 Mont. 375, 389, 641 P.2d 431, 439 (1982) (suggesting that the appeal
process for teacher dismissals "does not appear to be judicial economy"); Kelsey v. School
Dist. No. 25, 84 Mont. 453, 460, 276 P. 26, 27 (1929) (observing that the teacher
dismissal was an "illustration of 'the law's delays').
95. See Max A. Bailey & Nancy W. Sindelar, Freedom of Speech and the
Incompetent/Competent Teacher, 38 WEST's EDUC. L. REP. 1151, 1151 (1987) (noting
that without articulated guidelines, standards of review for teachers are "closely tied to
the mores of society").
96. Kelsey, 84 Mont. at 458, 276 P. at 26.
97. See MONTANA LEGIS. COuNcIL, TEACHER TENuRE IN MONTANA: AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE LAws AND IssuEs 7 (1984) (report to the 49th Legislature Joint
Interim Subcommittee No. 4) (citing 1913 Mont. Laws 76) [hereinafter TEACHER TENURE
BALDRIDGE v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES
nationwide effort to provide teachers with "the promise of [job]
permanence, income security, and the academic freedom to
teach."98 An Illinois court commenting on tenure observed:
The [tenure statute] was intended to protect ... teachers whose
employment otherwise was at the mercy of school boards .... "Its
object was to improve the ... school system by assuring teachers
of experience and ability a continuous service and a rehiring based
upon merit rather than failure to rehire upon reasons that are
political, partisan or capricious." 99
B. "Good Cause" for Dismissal - What Does that Mean?
Counterbalanced against tenurial rights is the historic right
of school boards to dismiss teachers for good cause.10 0 Until
1997, the Montana Code specified four types of misconduct that
constituted good cause: (1) immorality, (2) unfitness, (3)
incompetence, and (4) violations of school district policies.' 0l
The Montana Legislature, however, never supplied concomitant
definitions for each dismissal ground. Consequently, dismissals
have been highly fact-driven, lacking meaningful precedential
value for subsequent termination disputes. In Baldridge II, for
example, the supreme court turned to the American Heritage
Dictionary to define "unfitness," despite nearly a century of
court opinions applying this statutory ground.102
In 1997, the 55th Montana Legislature replaced these specific
dismissal grounds with the blanket authority to terminate for
IN MONTANA].
98. Id.
99. Miller v. Board of Educ., 200 N.E.2d 838, 842 (IM. App. Ct. 1964) (quoting
Donahoo v. Board of Educ., 109 N.E.2d 787, 789 (1953)); see also Board of Educ. v. Wood,
717 S.W.2d 837, 839 (Ky. 1986).
100. See Kelsey v. School Dist. No. 25, 84 Mont. 453, 458, 276 P. 26, 26 (1929)
(holding that if a teacher's "removal was'made without good cause, the teacher so
removed must be reinstated, and shall be entitled to compensation for the time lost
during the pending of the appeal") (citing MONT REV. CODE ANN. § 1085 (Smith 1921)).
Even before the adoption of tenure, Montana territorial law required school boards to
have "sufficient cause" to dismiss a teacher working under an employment contract. See
TEACHER TENURE IN MONTANA, supra note 97, at 7 (citing 1871 Codified Statutes of
Mont. 27).
101. See MONT. REV. CODE § 1085 (1921) (ultimately recodified as MONT. CODE
ANN. § 20-4-207 (1985)). These four statutory grounds were in effect at the time of
Baldridge's 1989 dismissal. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. Ultimately, the
Montana Supreme Court that Baldridge's dismissal was founded under unfitness, the
second ground. See Baldridge II, 287 Mont. 53, 62, 951 P.2d 1343, 1349 (1997).
102. See 287 Mont. at 59, 951 P.2d at 1347.
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"good cause." 10 3  Once again, no guidelines or definition
accompanied this provision. Legislators felt none were
necessary, since practitioners generally understood good cause
to mean "a good, decent reason to terminate employment." 1°4
Essentially, teacher dismissals remain highly speculative and
vulnerable to abuse, ensuring future protracted litigation over
whether good cause exists in particular teacher firings.
C. Burden of Proof - Preponderance of the Evidence
In Trustees v. Anderson,105 the Montana Supreme Court
recognized a rebuttable presumption that tenured teachers are
fit to teach. 0 6 Underlying this rebuttable presumption is the
historic notion that "a teacher's tenure is a substantial,
valuable, and beneficial right, which cannot be taken away
except for good cause." 0 7 Accordingly, a school district bears the
burden of proving good cause to dismiss a teacher by a
preponderance of evidence.10 8  This preponderance burden
requires the school board to supply evidence of good cause that
convincingly outweighs all available proof of a teacher's fitness
to teach. 0 9 If a board cannot meet its burden, it has violated its
statutory obligation to dismiss only for good cause."10
D. The Appeal Process - An Illustration of the Law's Delays
At the time of Baldridge's dismissal, teachers appealed
termination decisions to their county superintendent of
schools."' The county superintendent would then conduct a de
103. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-4-203(4) ("Upon receiving tenure, the employment
of a teacher may be terminated for good cause."). Certainly, this blanket "good cause"
provision encompasses the four historic statutory grounds, but now allows for other
causes that would not fit neatly within those articulated categories.
104. See Hearings on H.B. 49 Before the Senate Comm. on Educ. & Cultural
Resources at 2, 55th Leg. Sess. (Mont. 1997) (statement of Lance Melton, Mont. Sch. Bd.
Assoc.).
105. 232 Mont. 501, 757 P.2d 1315 (1988).
106. See id. at 504, 757 P.2d at 1317.
107. Yanzick v. School Dist. No. 23, 196 Mont. 375, 391, 641 P.2d 431, 440 (1982)
(citing State ex rel Saxtorph v. District Court (Fergus County), 128 Mont. 353, 361, 275
P.2d 209, 214 (1954)).
108. See id. at 505, 757 P.2d at 1318; Trustees v. Holden, 231 Mont. 491, 495, 754
P.2d 506, 509 (1988).
109. See Trustees v. Pacific Employer's Ins. Co., 263 Mont. 121, 128, 866 P.2d 1118,
1122 (1993).
110. See id.
111. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-4-207 (1987).
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novo hearing, rendering findings of fact and conclusions of
law. 112 The next levels of appeal were the State Superintendent
of Public Instruction, followed by the state district court and
Montana Supreme Court. 113
These multiple decisional tiers, coupled with vague
dismissal grounds, have long complicated and protracted the
teacher dismissal process. 114 In 1929, the Montana Supreme
Court, remarking on a prolonged teacher dismissal case,
commented that the process was "an illustration of 'the law's
delays. " 115 Nearly seventy years later, the Baldridge I court
echoed that sentiment:
[Tihis case serves as a perfect example of why [the appeal]
procedure in Montana should be the subject of future, careful
legislative scrutiny. The present process . . . is technical,
cumbersome, time-consuming, costly, frustrating and inefficient. .
. Simply put, the current procedures serve no one well - neither
teachers, school boards and administrations, county and state
school authorities, nor the judicial system.116
Answering the Montana Supreme Court's requests for
reform, the 55th Montana Legislature removed the state
superintendent from the appellate process. 117 Now appeals of
county superintendent decisions land directly in state district
court, and those holdings remain appealable to the Montana
Supreme Court.118
112. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-4-204 (1987). Although termed an "appeal," the
county superintendent was not bound by the determinations of the school board.
Instead, the county superintendent was the initial fact finder, conducting her own
hearing where the parties put forth supporting evidence, including witness testimony.
After the hearing, the county superintendent made her own factual findings and legal
conclusions independent of the school board's decision.
113. See id.
114. Five separate tribunals heard Baldridge's case on thirteen occasions.
Interview with Elmer Baldridge, in Bozeman, Mont. (July 7, 1999). This count does not
include arbitration proceedings and Montana Board of Labor Appeals hearings
concerning related employment issues arising from Baldridge's termination. Id.
115. Kelsey v. School Dist. No. 25, 84 Mont. 453,455, 276 P. 26, 27 (1929).
116. Baldridge 1, 264 Mont. 199, 211-12, 870 P.2d 711, 718-19 (1994); see also
Yanzick v. School Dist. No. 23, 196 Mont. 375, 389, 641 P.2d 431, 439 (1982) ("We
suggest that the initial hearings followed by three separate and in part duplicating
appeals does not appear to be judicial economy or an appropriate manner of disposing of
a contested case... [and] is an appropriate area for legislative consideration.").
117. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-4-204(5) (1999); see also Hearings on H.B. 49 Before
the Senate Comm. on Educ. & Cultural Resources at 7, 55th Leg. Sess. (Mont. 1997)
(statement of Rep. Alvin Ellis, Jr., bill sponsor).
118. See § 20-4-204(5). Not every teacher can take this route, however. Because of
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E. Standards of Review
Because of the many appellate levels, the Montana Supreme
Court frequently confused the appropriate standards of review.
Often, the court reversed a county superintendent's legal
conclusions only when there was an abuse of discretion. 119
Other times, the court reviewed both factual findings and legal
conclusions for clear error.120 In Baldridge I, the court set the
record straight. The supreme court will reverse a county
superintendent's legal conclusions if it deems them incorrect. 121
With findings of fact, however, the court will extend deferential
review, reversing only if there is clear error.122
The Baldridge I ruling is consistent with Montana's
traditional policy that a distant court should not interfere with
the minutia of local school board decisions unless there is an
abuse of discretion. As the Montana Supreme Court articulated
in Kelsey v. School District No. 25:123
It is unquestionably the policy of this state, as declared by the
Legislative Assembly, that ordinary school controversies shall be
adjusted by those who are specially trusted with that duty. It is
not the policy to encourage resort to courts in such matters. So long
as school officers act legally and within the power expressly
conferred upon them the courts will not interfere. 124
Despite the 55th Montana Legislature's affirmative steps to
simplify the appeal procedure of tenured teacher terminations,
additional 1997 amendments, the exclusive remedy for teachers working under collective
bargaining contracts is binding arbitration. See id.
119. See, e.g., Throssel v. Board of Trustees, 248 Mont. 392, 396, 812 P.2d 767, 769
(1991); Johnson v. Board of Trustees, 236 Mont. 532, 538, 771 P.2d 137, 141 (1989);
Trustees v. Anderson, 232 Mont. 501, 503-04, 757 P.2d 1315, 1317 (1988); Kelsey, 84
Mont. at 455, 276 P. at 27.
120. See, e.g., Trustees v. Holden, 231 Mont. 491, 493, 754 P.2d 506, 508 (1988);
Yanzick v. School Dist. No. 23, 196 Mont. 375, 389, 641 P.2d 431, 439 (1982).
121. See Baldridge 1, 264 Mont. 199, 205, 870 P.2d 711, 714 (1994) (citing Steer, Inc.
v. Department of Revenue, 245 Mont. 470, 474, 803 P.2d 601, 603 (1990)).
122. Relying upon Steer Inc., the Montana Supreme Court further explained: "[A]
finding is 'clearly erroneous' when, although there is evidence to support it, a review of
the record leaves the court with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed. [citation omitted]." 245 Mont. 470, 474, 803 P.2d 601, 603 (1990).
Ultimately, the confusion over review standards added three years to Baldridge's appeal.
Interview with Elmer Baldridge, in Bozeman, Mont. (July 7, 1999).
123. 84 Mont. 453, 276 P. 26 (1929).
124. Kelsey v. School Dist. No. 25, 84 Mont. 453, 454, 276 P. 26, 26-27 (1929)
(emphasis added).
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the lack of guidance for determining good cause persists.
Interestingly, these 1997 reforms took effect six months prior to
the Baldridge 11 decision. Although the time was ripe for
judicial commentary, the Baldridge 11 court sidestepped the
opportunity to articulate guidelines for assisting teachers and
school districts in the dismissal process.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE BALDRIDGE 11 HOLDING
A Improper Substitution of Judgment
In Baldridge 11, the majority held that the county
superintendent had not committed clear error and that her
extensive findings of fact were undisputed. 125 Despite this
ruling, the court construed the factual record differently than
the county superintendent. For instance, the county
superintendent specifically found that Baldridge's "rough
month" remark was a slip-of-the-tongue, and not a reference to
menstruation. 126  Nevertheless, the court determined that
Baldridge made a joke about a student's menstrual period.127
The county superintendent also found that neither the glove
incident, the "stop, drop, and blow" incident, the testes joke, nor
the finger pricking incident had sexually derogatory
connotations. 128 Directly contradicting these factual findings,
the court concluded that Baldridge made "gender-based remarks
and innuendoes in his classroom."129
In Yanzick v. School District No. 23,130 the Montana
Supreme Court noted that, except in situations of clear error, a
reviewing court cannot substitute its judgment for that of a
county superintendent concerning factual findings. 131 The court
explained that:
The County Superintendent was in the position of the trier of fact,
and so was able to hear and evaluate the testimony of the various
125. See 287 Mont. 53, 58, 951 P.2d 1343, 1346 (1997); see also discussion supra
Part II.B.2 (setting forth the factual findings).
126. See County Superintendent's Order, supra note 21, at 16 (Finding of Fact No.
30).
127. See Baldridge 11, 287 Mont. 53, 60, 951 P.2d 1343, 1347 (1997).
128. See County Superintendent's Order, supra note 21, at 9-14 (Finding of Fact
Nos. 17-28).
129. Baldridge 11, 287 Mont. at 60, 951 P.2d at 1348.
130. 196 Mont. 375, 641 P.2d 431 (1982).
131. See id. at 388, 396, 641 P.2d at 439, 443.
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witnesses. Some of the evidence definitely is conflicting. Under
such circumstances, the conclusions of the trier of fact deserve
particular weight. 132
Johnson v. Board of Trustees133 reiterated the Montana
Supreme Court's position that its role is not to reweigh a county
superintendent's findings. 134 This precedent is consistent with
the dissent's stance in Baldridge II that the county
superintendent "was in the best position to analyze the context
of [Baldridge's] remarks and judge his fitness to teach."135
To reach the conclusion that Baldridge's conduct was
sexually derogatory, the majority had to weigh the evidence
differently than the county superintendent. In doing so, the
court improperly substituted its judgment for that of the county
superintendent and contravened its own precedential mandates.
B. Selective Treatment of the Record
In addition to reweighing the evidentiary record, the
Baldridge II majority excised portions of the record as irrelevant
to its inquiry.136 Specifically, the court chose not to consider the
county superintendent's findings that: Baldridge did not intend
his conduct to have a sexually derogatory meaning; the students
were not adversely harmed by Baldridge's conduct; Baldridge
consistently received high performance evaluations; Baldridge
exhibited remorse and took remedial steps to correct his
behavior; and Baldridge continued to have a good reputation
with both students and fellow teachers. 137 The court reasoned
that Baldridge's conduct itself was the only relevant factor in
assessing the propriety of a teacher's dismissal. 138
This reasoning, however, is inconsistent with the supreme
court's stance in prior teacher dismissal decisions. In Trustees v.
Anderson, the court directed: "When a tenured position is at
132. Id.
133. 236 Mont. 532, 771 P.2d 137 (1989).
134. See id. at 538, 771 P.2d at 141; see also Trustees v. Anderson, 232 Mont. 501,
505, 757 P.2d 1315, 1318 (1988) (admonishing the district court for abusing its discretion
"in substituting its judgment" for that of the fact finder).
135. Baldridge H, 287 Mont. 53, 67, 951 P.2d 1343, 1352 (1997) (Trieweiler, J.,
dissenting).
136. See 287 Mont. at 61, 951 P.2d at 1348.
137. See discussion supra Part ll.B.2 (detailing the county superintendent's
findings).
138. See 287 Mont. at 61, 951 P.2d at 1348.
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stake, the teacher must have the benefit of having all the
available evidence properly considered and weighed."13 9
Likewise, Johnson requires that a teacher's dismissal must be
based upon a review of the entire record.140 It is incongruous for
the supreme court to charge fact finders with conducting a
comprehensive factual review of a teacher's dismissal but
preserve for itself the ability to selectively disregard portions of
the record as it did in Baldridge H.
C. The Mysterious Per Se Standard
By holding that Baldridge was unfit to continue teaching as
a matter of law, the Montana Supreme Court radically
undermined the nature of review applied in teacher dismissals.
Essentially, the court determined that certain types of conduct
are automatically "good cause" for dismissal, and no factual
inquiry into the context surrounding the alleged misconduct is
necessary. Sua sponte, the court interposed a per se standard
into the teacher dismissal process. Neither statutes nor case
law authorized the court to create such a standard.
From the perspective of an appellate court, the allure of a
per se standard is understandable. By finding per se good cause,
the factual findings of the county superintendent concerning the
circumstances surrounding Baldridge's conduct became
irrelevant. Artfully avoiding the deferential standard of review
for these factual findings, the supreme court was able to
overrule the county superintendent as being incorrect as a
matter of law. 41 Yet as one California court observed:
[A]ttempt[s] to escape the application of this principle of
[deferential] appellate review by claiming the defendant's conduct
in itself proves unfitness to teach must fail, since neither statute
nor decisional authority has applied a rule of per se unfitness ....
The fact that [a teacher] may have committed [misconduct] does
not authorize an appellate court to disregard contrary trial court
findings and declare him unfit to teach per se.142
139. 232. Mont. 501, 505, 757 P.2d 1315, 1318 (specifically addressing the duration
of a teacher's employment and a teacher's good performance over time) (emphasis
added); see also Yanzick v. School Dist. No. 23, 196 Mont. 375, 392, 641 P.2d 431, 441
(1982) ("We have already indicated that the record must show good cause for the
termination of a teacher's tenure.").
140. 236 Mont. 532, 538, 771 P.2d 137, 141.
141. See discussion supra Part III.E (explaining the Baldridge I review standards).
142. Board of Educ. v. Jack M., 566 P.2d 602, 603, 607 (Cal. 1977) (emphasis
2000 269
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
The Baldridge II court's per se standard also confounded the
already elusive process of determining good cause in teacher
dismissals. If another teacher commits conduct similar to
Baldridge's, should the school board automatically dismiss this
teacher without hearing testimony about the context in which
the behavior occurred? Arguably, if a board finds that
misconduct occurred and then deems the conduct unfit per se,
any factual inquiry into the surrounding circumstances would be
superfluous. For this very reason, other appellate courts have
strongly admonished lower tribunals for finding good cause as a
matter of law, except in the most egregious circumstances such
as criminal convictions for sex offenses. 143
By imposing a per se standard, the Baldridge II court placed
itself in the awkward position of umpiring good cause on a case-
by-case basis. Moreover, the supreme court must make these
per se determinations based upon a cold record - unlike the
county superintendent who hears direct testimony on the
matter. Ultimately, the per se approach usurps a community's
ability to assess what constitutes good cause in the unique
context of their individual school system. Teachers and school
administrators must speculate as to what other behavior (or
bundle of behaviors) might constitute per se good cause in the
eyes of a distant appellate court.
The Baldridge II court's improper substitution of
judgment, failure to consider the full factual record, and creation
of a per se standard are all manifestations of the same disorder:
a lack of articulated guidelines to assist school administration,
county superintendents, and appellate courts in making a
consistent inquiry into teacher dismissals. Without clear
judicial guidance, the future beyond Baldridge II promises more
complexity and expense for all involved. Yet Montana has the
capacity to promulgate meaningful guidelines that streamline
the teacher dismissal process while affording greater protection
to both school districts and teachers. Both extra- and intra-
jurisdictional approaches provide valuable models for reforming
the teacher dismissal process.
added).
143. See, e.g., Jack M., 566 P.2d at 603; Hoagland v. Mount Vernon Sch. Dist., 623
P.2d 1156, 1159 (Wash. 1983) ("In most cases, because the statutes do not stipulate
certain conduct as per se grounds for dismissal, it will be a question of fact whether the
complained of acts constitute sufficient cause.").
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V. MODELS FOR REFORM
A. Political or Personal Motive Inquiry
Tenure's primary goal is to protect a teacher from
unwarranted administrative reprisal. 144 Consistent with this
public policy against retaliatory firings, courts scrutinize teacher
dismissals for potential underlying political or personal
motives. 145  Indeed, evidence of improper motive is often
dispositive in a dismissal case, compelling reversal of a
termination even where separate, legitimate grounds exist.' 46
Moreover, some courts treat the mere inference of political
motive as reason to overrule a dismissal. 14v
Mirroring this national trend, the Montana Supreme Court
has reversed teacher dismissals prompted in part by personal
motive. In Phillips v. Trustees,14 the supreme court reviewed a
county superintendent's holding that a tenured English teacher
was unjustly terminated due to personality conflicts with her
school superintendent. 49 A high school teacher of sixteen years,
Phillips received notice that the school district had terminated
144. See discussion supra Part IU.A (summarizing the public policy behind tenure).
145. See, e.g., Ballato v. Board of Educ., 633 A.2d 323, 326 (Conn. 1993) (noting that
tenure is intended to prevent terminations due to political motivations or "mere
whimsy"); Springgate v. School Comm. 415 N.E.2d 888, 889 (Mass. 1981) (ruling that the
court has the "function of determining whether [a] school committee acted on the
evidence rather than out of bias, political pressure, or other improper motive").
146. See, e.g., Simard v. Board of Educ., 473 F.2d 988, 995 (2nd Cir. 1973) ("While
we have concluded that adequate evidence supported the Board's action, that does not
necessarily defeat a claim of retaliatory nonrenewal."); Harlan County Bd. of Educ. v.
Stagnolia, 555 S.W.2d 828, 830 (Ky. 1977) ("If the primary reason [for the teacher
demotions] ... was to punish the teachers ... for their political activities, then such
action was arbitrary and void. Simply because the superintendent could have been
otherwise motivated by some proper purpose does not mean that these other purposes
played a real part in his decision.... .") (citing Calhoun v. Cassady, 534 S.W.2d 806, 808
(Ky. 1976).
147. See Stagnolia, 555 S.W.2d at 830 ("As a matter of proof, there need be no more
than an inference of arbitrariness [to establish a wrongful termination].") (citing Snapp
v. Deskins, 450 S.W.2d 246, 252 (Ky. 1970). Several states have even enacted express
statutory prohibitions against politically driven teacher dismissals. See, e.g., ALA. CODE
§ 16-24-8 (1998); IND. CODE ANN. § 20-6.1-4-10(b) (West 1999). As a final safeguard,
many state courts construe ambiguities in dismissal statutes in favor of tenured teachers
to protect "the favored status which they have earned." See Miller v. Board of Educ., 200
N.E.2d 838, 842 (IMI. App. Ct. 1964); see also, e.g., Fresno City High Sch. Dist. v. De
Caristo, 92 P.2d 668, 671 (Cal. 1939) (superseded by statute upon separate grounds); Lea
v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 84 So. 2d 610, 613 (La. 1955); Kletzkin v. Board of Educ., 642
A.2d 993, 994 (N.J. 1994); Miller v. Board of Educ., 437 S.E.2d 591, 596 (W. Va. 1993).
148. 263 Mont. 336, 867 P.2d 1104 (1994).
149. See id. at 339, 867 P.2d at 1106.
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her position for economic reasons. 150  Acknowledging that
financial concerns may have been a separate basis for dismissal,
the supreme court nonetheless upheld the county
superintendent's conclusion that improper motives invalidated
the termination.'15
Unfortunately, the Montana Supreme Court has been
inconsistent in its vigilance against improper motives in teacher
dismissals. In Baldridge H, for example, the court disregarded
the undisputed, longstanding history of animosity between
Baldridge and the school administrators who fired him. To truly
comport with Montana's public policy mandate of protecting
tenured teachers, the Montana Supreme Court must uniformly
review dismissal cases for the presence of improper motive.
B. Model Criteria
"Good cause" determinations should flow from sound factual
inquiries into the circumstances surrounding a teacher
dismissal. As Baldridge II demonstrates, if a fact finder lacks
articulated guidelines to follow in her inquiry, "good cause"
becomes a mere legal abstraction vulnerable to suppositions and
mores. Where one county superintendent might find that a
teacher's remediability obviates the need for dismissal, another
county superintendent could find the same fact irrelevant. At
the appellate level, this absence of guidelines invites further
judicial speculation when reviewing the cold evidentiary record
of a dismissal. 5 2 Consequently, both teacher and school district
must navigate through local hearings and appellate review
relying upon hunches of how a particular tribunal might
interpret "good cause."
To mitigate such problems, several state supreme courts
have recognized the need for standardized factual inquiries that
remain consistent from the initial fact finder up through the
highest level of review. 53 Such standardization ensures that all
150. See id. at 337-38, 867 P.2d at 1105.
151. See id. at 339, 867 P.2d at 1106.
152. In part, this may explain the disparate holdings among tribunals in Baldridge
II, where the county superintendent reversed Baldridge's dismissal, the state
superintendent and district court endorsed the dismissal, and a divided supreme court
(5-2) upheld the dismissal.
153. See, e.g., Morrison v. California Board of Educ., 461 P.2d 375, 386 (1969);
Board of Educ. v. Flaming, 938 P.2d 151, 159 (Colo. 1997); McBrown v. Board of Educ.,
494 N.E.2d 1191, 1195 (Ill. 1986); Erb v. Iowa Board of Pub. Instruct., 216 N.W.2d 339,
343 (Iowa 1974) (superseded on other grounds); Wright v. Superintending Sch. Comm.,
331 A 2d 640, 646 (Me. 1975); In re Donna Thomas, 926 S.W.2d 163, 165 (Mo. 1996);
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tenured teachers, regardless of their school district, receive
comparable inquiries into the propriety of their dismissals.
Moreover, uniform standards supply school boards with a
greater degree of certainty in determining what evidence they
must provide to support a tenured teacher dismissal. Where a
school board supplies sound documentation to support its
position on each factual inquiry, it greatly reduces the chance of
reversal on appeal.
These standardized inquiries require a fact finder to
examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding a teacher
dismissal, including:
1. underlying motives of teacher conduct;
2. age and maturity of students affected;
3. degree of adverse effect upon students and fellow
teachers;
4. extenuating circumstances surrounding conduct;
5. likelihood of conduct being repeated after reprimand;
6. opportunity for remediation; 154
7. degree of remorse exhibited by teacher;
8. proximity of time between occurrence of conduct and
reprimand;
9. overall reputation and record of teacher over time;155 and
10. extent to which disciplinary action will have a chilling
effect upon other teachers. 156
Hoagland v. Mount Vernon Sch. Dist. No. 320, 623 P.2d 1156 (Wash. 1981).
154. Some state courts treat remediability as a threshold inquiry, holding that if a
teacher's misconduct is remediable, there should be no dismissal. Rather, a teacher
should be allowed a reasonable time to overcome the dismissal grounds. See, e.g., Waller
v. Board of Educ., 302 N.E.2d 190, 191-93 (Ill. 1973); Board of Educ. v. Wolff, 361 N.W.2d
750, 753 (Mich. 1984). Some state legislatures have even codified a remedial period into
their dismissal statutes. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-539(C) (West 1998); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 122A.40(9)(d) (West 1998); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-25-440 (Law. Co-op. 1998).
155. With respect to this particular criterion, the Illinois Supreme Court has even
allowed consideration of the positive testimony of former students and supervisors from
a dismissed teacher's past employment in another school district. See Board of Educ. v.
Sickley, 479 N.E.2d 1142, 1144 (Ill. 1985).
156. Interestingly, these criteria, although tailored for the unique context of teacher
dismissals, closely parallel portions of the "just cause" factual inquiries employed in the
arbitration of wrongful discharges, which include:
(1) Did the employer give to the employee forewarning or foreknowledge of the
possible disciplinary consequences of the employees' conduct? ...
(4) Was the employer's investigation conducted fairly and objectively?...
(7) Was the degree of discipline administered by the employer reasonably
related to the seriousness of the employee's proven offense and the record of
the employee in his or her service with the employer?
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These criteria are such that a teacher who truly does not
belong in the classroom cannot hide behind her tenurial
protections. At the same time, the criteria require a school
district to document and address teacher misconduct and
provide the best possible case that dismissal is appropriate.
Fact finders within these states must issue detailed findings
regarding those criteria relevant to a particular teacher's
dismissal.157 On review, an appellate court can examine the
record to ensure that substantial evidence exists to support the
fact finder. 158 Without exception, each appellate court reviewing
a fact finder's inquiry will reverse only where clear error
exists.159
Judicially formulated guidelines are not a novel concept,
especially regarding issues where the courts have deemed
community discretion significant. In obscenity challenges, for
example, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that
obscenity is not determinable in isolation, but must be assessed
in the light of the context of the community within which it
arises. 60 At the same time, however, the Court requires uniform
guidelines for communities and tribunals to rely upon in order to
lend consistency and fairness to obscenity inquiries. 1 1
Accordingly, the Court established a flexible, standardized
inquiry that all triers of fact must make in any obscenity
determination. 16 2
Interestingly, the Montana Legislature already employs
similar processes in the family law arena. Like teacher tenure
law, family law is a highly fact-driven field. The creation of
parenting plans necessitates a court determination of "the best
interest of the child"'13-a phrase evoking as much subjectivity
See Hearings on H.B. 49 Before the House Educ. Comm., Exhibit 8 at 1-2, 55th Leg. Sess.
(Mont. 1997) (Oct. 25, 1996, correspondence from John Astle, President, Montana
Arbitrators Association).
157. See generally supra note 153.
15& See generally supra note 153.
159. See generally supra note 153.
160. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 28 (1973).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 24 ("The basic guidelines for the trier of fact [in an obscenity inquiry]
must be: (a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards"
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether
the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically
defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.")
163. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-212 (1999) ("(1) The court shall determine the
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as the "good cause" requirement. Recognizing the vagueness of
the "best interest" standard, the Montana Legislature furnished
thirteen criteria for fact finders to apply. 1 4 The Montana
Supreme Court in turn requires the fact finder to address each
relevant criterion in her findings of fact, reversing these findings
only if clearly erroneous. 165
These statutory criteria ensure a level of consistency among
cases involving children by requiring that every decision
touching upon a child's interests address the identical thirteen
considerations. At the same time, the criteria allow the fact
finder the flexibility necessary in these factually diverse cases.
A reviewing court need only look to the fact finder's discussion of
each criterion to assess whether she is clearly erroneous in light
of the evidence. Without clear error, a reviewing court may not
reverse the fact finder. This process minimizes the degree of
subjectivity involved at each stage of a case.
In a similar manner, standardized guidelines for tenure
dismissals can supply enough flexibility to meet unique school
district needs while also safeguarding a teacher's tenurial
rights. Local fact finders from Glendive to Kalispell, Montana,
would all address the identical criteria, while taking into
consideration the size, ethnic composition, and unique needs of
their particular school and student body.
C. Application of Reform Models
Without political motivation inquiries and standardized
guidelines, there is an ongoing risk that the fact finder and
appellate courts will focus their examinations solely upon the
parenting plan in accordance with the best interest of the child.").
164. See id. ("(1)... The court shall consider all relevant parenting factors, which
may include but are not limited to: (a) the wishes of the child's parent or parents; (b) the
wishes of the child; (c) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child's
parent or parents and siblings and with any other person who significantly affects the
child's best interest; (d) the child's adjustment to home, school, and community; (e) the
mental and physical health of all individuals involved; (f) physical abuse or threat of
physical abuse by one parent against the other parent or the child; (g) chemical
dependency, as defined in 53-24-103, or chemical abuse on the part of either parent; (h)
continuity and stability of care; (i) developmental needs of the child; (j) whether a parent
has knowingly failed to pay birth-related costs that the parent is able to pay, which is
considered to be not in the child's best interests; (k) whether a parent has knowingly
failed to financially support a child that the parent is able to support, which is
considered to be not in the child's best interests; (1) whether the child has frequent and
continuing contact with both parents... ; (m) adverse effects on the child resulting from
continuous and vexatious parenting plan amendment actions.").
165. See Cameron v. Cameron, 197 Mont. 226, 231, 641 P.2d 1057, 1060 (1982).
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teacher's conduct to the exclusion of all other evidence. 16 6 Such
narrow inquiries can leave a teacher vulnerable to the "witch
hunt" phenomenon, 16 7  where community members or
administrators target a teacher for personal or political reasons
and lay in wait for him to make a misstep justifying dismissal.
Picture, if you will, a teacher who fails to show up for her
second-grade class for an entire week, leaving her students
unattended. At the end of this week, school administration gave
her notice of termination. On its face, this teacher's conduct
appears clearly improper. But there is more to this teacher's
story. In her absence, this teacher has been lawfully striking
against unfair wages. Moreover, she notified the school in
advance of her intent to strike and return to her duties once the
strike was over. An inquiry limited exclusively to the teacher's
conduct - neglect of her classroom duties - would likely support
dismissal. Alternatively, an inquiry of the conduct and its
surrounding circumstances may preclude dismissal. 68
In contrast, consider a music teacher with an outstanding
eighteen-year career who faces dismissal for lightly tapping a
student on the head for not paying attention. At first glance,
this behavior does not appear to rise to the level of dismissal.
But this was the teacher's fourth incident of physical discipline
in a school district that prohibits corporal punishment; and,
after her third incident, school administration warned her that
another violation would result in termination. She had
previously yanked a boy's hair for not paying attention; rapped a
child's knuckles with a xylophone stick, leaving red marks; and
grabbed a boy by the shoulders, pushing him into the blackboard
and bumping his head. After these incidents, the school placed
her on a strict policy of no physical punishment. Placed within a
context of repeated misconduct, this teacher's innocuous act may
become a legitimate basis for dismissal. 169
166. See Board of Educ. v. Jack M., 566 P.2d 602, 608 (Cal. 1977) (admonishing that
a dismissal hearing should not "be limited to the single question [ofl whether the teacher
committed the charged act.").
167. See Yanzick v. School Dist. No. 23, 196 Mont. 375, 404, 641 P.2d 431, 448
(1982) ("[Wn my opinion, the Court is countenancing a 'witch hunt' in this case. The
Court is condoning a legal determination based upon rumor and hearsay. In doing so,
the security of tenure has been dealt a serious blow. The precedential effect will
necessarily diminish academic freedom in Montana.") (Morrison, J., registering a
"vigorous" dissent).
168. This hypothetical is patterned after actual facts set forth in Martin v.
Montezuma-Cortez Sch. Dist., 841 P.2d 237 (Colo. 1992).
169. This hypothetical is patterned after actual facts set forth in Board of Educ. v.
Flaming, 938 P.2d 151, 159 (Colo. 1997).
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In Baldridge's case, an application of the reform models is
instructive. First, let us inquire into any political motivations
that may have prompted Baldridge's dismissal. The Board did
not set forth any political grounds to support its dismissal.
Nonetheless, the undisputed facts on record reveal a
longstanding animosity between Baldridge and certain Board
members. 170 In particular, Baldridge was known to be a "thorn
in the side" of School Superintendent Tokerud. 171 He confronted
Tokerud and the Board on their treatment of Native American
students. 172 As a union leader, he successfully challenged school
administration on numerous grievances. 173
Additionally, the students testifying against Baldridge
lacked veracity and many were children of Board members. 174
One student even conceded that his father, who was on the
Board, had complained of Baldridge's outspoken criticisms
"causing problems with the School Board."175  The record
indicated that other teachers committing similar conduct as
Baldridge's received no punishment.176 Moreover, the record
demonstrated that the Board's summary dismissal of Baldridge
was disparate from its discipline of other teachers:
Mr. Baldridge is the first teacher to be summarily discharged by
the District for a first offense, without the benefit of progressive
discipline.... [T]he disciplinary action meted out by the District
to other teachers under circumstances that are considered far
more serious . . . [consisted ofi verbal warnings, written
reprimands, and a suspension. 177
There is enough evidence to suggest that Baldridge's
activism may have been a motivating force behind his dismissal.
170. See County Superintendent's Order, supra note 21, at 6 (Finding of Fact No. 8).
171. See id.
172. See id. at 6 (Finding of Fact No. 5).
173. See Appellant's Brief, supra note 19, at 5.
174. See County Superintendent's Order, supra note 21, at 13, 29 (Finding of Fact
No. 27, Conclusion of Law No. 29) (determining that one student "does not have a very
good reputation for any truth or veracity at all" and that the students "belonged to a
clique").
175. Transcript, supra note 30, at 91 (testimony of Chris Novasio, Colstrip High
School student).
176. See County Superintendent's Order, supra note 21, at 12-13 (Finding of Fact
No. 25) (noting that two other teachers at Colstrip High School told the identical "testes"
joke to their classes without reprimand). Arguably, a key indicia of political motive
would be a lack of equanimity in punishment among teachers with similar conduct.
177. Arbitrator's Opinion, supra note 22, at 31-32.
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The county superintendent's findings are replete with references
to the hostility between Baldridge and school administrators,
indicating that the presence of improper motives influenced her
ultimate conclusion. Despite this strong showing of political
taint, the reviewing courts opted not to consider improper
motive in assessing Baldridge's dismissal.
Next, let us apply the standardized judicial guidelines to the
circumstances surrounding Baldridge's dismissal:
1. Underlying Motives of Teacher Conduct
Baldridge's motivation for his conduct is highly disputed.
He testified that he intended his actions to be humorous - not to
convey a sexually derogatory message.178 Indeed, on past
performance evaluations, school administration had expressly
praised Baldridge on his effective use of humor in the
classroom. 179 Those parents and students testifying against
Baldridge clearly interpreted his words to have a sexually
derogatory motive. 80 The county superintendent found that
while Baldridge's behavior was inappropriate, his intentions
were innocuous and not aimed at offending his students.' 81
2. Age and Maturity of Students Affected
Baldridge's students were junior and senior high school
students. 8 2 The county superintendent found that the students
were mature enough not to be offended or adversely affected by
Baldridge's conduct.183
3. Adverse Effect Upon Students and Fellow Teachers
The female students testifying against Baldridge indicated
that his comments embarrassed them.184 Male students, on the
178. See generally Transcript, supra note 30, at 409-39 (testimony of Elmer
Baldridge).
179. See Colstrip Public Schools Teacher Evaluation Form for Elmer Baldridge,
Attachment at 1 (Dec. 17, 1987) (contained in the Montana Supreme Court record for
Baldridge II). Principal Pearce conducted this in-classroom evaluation.
179. See generally County Superintendent's Order, supra note 21, at 9-16 (Findings
of Fact Nos. 17-30).
181. See generally id.
182. See id. at 14 (Finding of Fact No. 28).
183. See id. at 12-16 (Findings of Fact Nos. 25-30).
184. See Transcript, supra note 30, at 59, 67 (testimonies of Kim Acton and Traci
Watson, Colstrip High School students).
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other hand, generally found the comments humorous.18 5 This
evidence tends to indicate that Baldridge's students did suffer
harm from the tenor of his comments. On the other hand, the
county superintendent noted that the infamous "glove incident"
that ultimately prompted Baldridge's dismissal led to no
complaints until over a month after its occurrence.18 6 Indeed,
she noted that "[w]hat some would consider as 'inappropriate' or
'loose language' was used by other faculty members at the school
and generally accepted by students."18 7 Ultimately, she found no
evidence that any long term adverse impact occurred to any
student or fellow teacher. 88
4. Extenuating Circumstances
When the county superintendent examined the extenuating
circumstances surrounding Baldridge's dismissal, she found that
a specific clique of students and their parents, who held
administrative positions in the school district, prompted the
dismissal. 8 9 She further found that there was longstanding
animosity between Baldridge and the administration' 90 arising
from his protests against certain employment practices and
treatment of Native American students.' 91
5. Likelihood of Conduct Being Repeated After Reprimand
The county superintendent made no specific finding
regarding the likelihood that Baldridge might repeat
inappropriate conduct after receiving his reprimand. However,
when Baldridge made the "bad month" comment, he
immediately apologized to the entire class and later spoke
individually with the female student whom he offended. 192
185. See id. at 30, 45 (testimonies of Nikki Novasio and Amy Coburn, Colstrip High
School students).
186. See County Superintendent's Order, supra note 21, at 9 (Finding of Fact No.
17) ("The statement was not an issue for the junior and senior high school students at
the time [it occurred].").
187. Id. at 28 (Conclusion of Law No. 25).
188. See id. at 9-16 (Findings of Fact Nos. 17-30) (finding that the incidents "did not
affect the student-teacher relationship between Baldridge and his students, nor did it
affect Baldridge's ability to perform his duties in the classroom.").
189. See id. at 29 (Conclusion of Law No. 29).
190. See id. at 17 (Finding of Fact No. 32) ("[The relationship between Baldridge
and Tokerud were [sic] strained at best.").
191. See id. at 6 (Finding of Fact No. 5).
192. See County Superintendent's Order, supra note 21, at 16 (Finding of Fact No.
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Likewise, when Principal Pearce notified Baldridge of the
parental complaint regarding the "glove incident," he
immediately remitted an apology letter to the parents. 93 This
behavior suggests that Baldridge was sincere in rectifying his
behavior.
6. Opportunity for Remediation
The county superintendent found that:
Baldridge was unaware of the deficiencies alleged by the
administrators. There was not a consistent, up-front approach
through written evaluation or prior notice about these incidents.
There was no evidence concerning Baldridge's teaching methods or
direction to improve his teaching abilities in the classroom which
were of concern to the District Superintendent and School
Board.1 94
Principal Pearce immediately suspended Baldridge upon
receiving the parental complaint regarding the glove incident.
After an administrative investigation, the suspension became an
official termination by the Board. Baldridge was given no prior
notice about the alleged incidents and no opportunity to
remediate his behavior before dismissal.195
7. Degree of Remorse Exhibited by Teacher
In each circumstance where Baldridge realized his behavior
had offended a student, he issued a prompt apology to the
injured parties.196 While Baldridge disagreed with how his
comments were construed, he sought to quickly repair any harm
caused. 97 His strong interest in his students suggests that
Baldridge exhibited sincere remorse for his behavior.
8. Proximity of Time Between Conduct and Reprimand
Baldridge's termination occurred two months after the
"glove incident." Many of his other alleged misconduct, however,
occurred in his preceding five years at Colstrip High School.' 98
193. See id. at 10 (Finding of Fact No. 21).
194. Id. at 26 (Conclusion of Law No. 18).
195. See id.
195. See generally id. at 9-16 (Findings of Fact Nos. 17-30).
197. See id. at 10, 16 (Findings of Fact Nos. 10, 30).
197. Interview with Elmer Baldridge, in Bozeman, Mont. (July 7, 1999).
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During this time, Baldridge received exemplary evaluations on
his teaching style; the administration neither received nor
issued complaints regarding Baldridge's classroom conduct; and
Baldridge received no warning that his behavior was potentially
offensive in any way.199
9. Overall Reputation and Record of Teacher Over Time
Baldridge enjoyed overwhelming popularity with the
Colstrip High School students.200 He was also well respected by
his fellow teachers. 201 Likewise, school administration
consistently gave Baldridge the highest possible rankings for his
classroom performance. 202 The county superintendent found
Baldridge to be "an excellent, conscientious teacher, devoted to
Colstrip Public Schools." 203
10. Chilling Effect Upon Other Teachers
The county superintendent did not render any specific
findings on the possible chilling effects of Baldridge's dismissal
upon his fellow teachers. Certainly, the faculty members
testifying on his behalf were disconcerted with the Board's
decision. Arguably, Baldridge's peers might be reluctant to
oppose school administration with the same fervor Baldridge
exhibited. They may also be more cautious about using humor
to develop student rapport. Considering the administration's
propensity to dredge up past misconduct of which teachers have
not been informed, there were legitimate concerns of a chilling
effect in this case.
In Florida, a case factually similar to Baldridge's arose in
MacMillan v. Nassau County School Board.204 There, high
school mathematics teacher Edwin MacMillan allegedly greeted
his female students with comments such as, "You're looking
hot," and "You're looking fine," as they entered his classroom. 20 5
The school board dismissed MacMillan for making suggestive
198. See County Superintendent's Order, supra note 21, at 5, 17 (Findings of Fact
Nos. 3-4, 32).
199. See id. at 5 (Finding of Fact No. 3).
200. See id.
202. See id. at 5 (Findings of Fact Nos. 3-4).
203. See id. at 29 (Conclusion of Law No. 30).
204. 629 So. 2d 226 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
205. See id. at 228.
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sexual innuendoes. 2 6 On appeal, the district court emphasized
that "the context in which MacMillan made the alleged improper
statements is critical to our determination."207
The court then examined the factual findings below,208
observing that: MacMillan never intended his comments to have
a sexual connotation; most students thought that MacMillan
was joking and did not feel uncomfortable or degraded;
MacMillan's comments were only "temporarily embarrassing" to
certain students, not causing irreparable harm to the student-
teacher relationship; and MacMillan was well-regarded among
his peers and a favorite teacher among students.20 9 Ultimately,
the court reversed MacMillan's dismissal, concluding that "the
record was devoid of competent evidence" to support the school
board's position.210
Both MacMillan and our application of the model guidelines
suggest that the Montana Supreme Court's finding of per se
"good cause" for Baldridge's dismissal is incorrect. While
Baldridge committed acts that lacked taste and judgment, these
acts were heavily outweighed by his strong teaching record and
student support. Because the Board never timely apprized
Baldridge of his past wrongdoings, Baldridge never received the
opportunity to rehabilitate his classroom behavior through
constructive administrative guidance. When political
motivations are added to the mix, the Board's decision becomes
even more suspect.
This is not to say that the Board should have condoned
Baldridge's remarks. Nonetheless, a more beneficial response
may have aimed to correct Baldridge's inappropriate conduct
while preserving his established tenurial protections. 211  A
206. See id. at 227.
207. Id. (emphasis added). The court's accent on context is analogous to the
"totality of circumstances" approach embraced by the model criteria. See discussion
supra Part V.B.
208. The district court accepted the factual findings below because the fact finder
supported each one with "detailed explanations" and "competent substantial evidence"
from the record. See MacMillan, 629 So. 2d at 229. Compare the Montana Supreme
Court's parallel conclusion in Baldridge I that the county superintendent's factual
findings were undisputed and therefore (purportedly) accepted in toto. See Baldridge H,
287 Mont. 53, 58, 951 P.2d 1343, 1346 (1997); see also discussion supra Part II.C.1.
209. See MacMillan, 629 So. 2d at 228-30. Note that the court's inquiries are nearly
identical to those required by the model criteria. See discussion supra Part V.B.
210. MacMillan v. Nassau County Sch. Bd., 629 So. 2d 226, 227 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1993).
210. Arbitrator Eric B. Lindauer observed that: "Baldridge's classroom conduct was
inappropriate and distasteful." Arbitrator's Opinion, supra note 22, at 28-29.
282 Vol. 61
BALDRIDGE v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES
formal Board reprimand coupled with a rehabilitation period
would have provided Baldridge with notice of the need for
behavioral reform.212 If Baldridge then repeated his misconduct
in the future, the school district would have had legitimate,
documented grounds for dismissal that passed the political
motive inquiry and the model guidelines.
VI. CONCLUSION
Teacher dismissals are a grievous process for all parties
involved. Teachers suffer community humiliation and the threat
of permanent revocation of their ability to teach in Montana.213
School districts face astronomical liability exposure in the form
of suspension pay, back pay, and lost future wages.214 They can
even be forced to reinstate the very teacher they desired to
terminate. Communities become divided as students, parents,
and fellow teachers testify for or against the terminated teacher.
Tribunals navigate the confounding process of determining what
constitutes "good cause" for dismissal without the benefit of any
meaningful precedent.
Baldridge II stands as a stark reminder of these flaws in
Montana's present tenured teacher dismissal process. Without
reform, parties will remain vulnerable to unpredictable,
protracted litigation over terminations. The erection of political
motive inquiries and standardized guidelines represents an
important step towards such reform. With these improvements,
tenure can truly become a substantial, valuable, and beneficial
right that attracts qualified new teachers to Montana.
Nonetheless, the arbitrator found that "the penalty imposed by the school district was
unreasonable" and that "Baldridge's conduct did not rise to the level that the progressive
discipline policy should have been set aside in favor of summary discharge." Id.
211. The arbitrator further noted: "Mhe District made no effort to apprise Mr.
Baldridge of the inappropriateness of his conduct or to employ any corrective disciplinary
measures to improve his conduct. It makes no sense to this Arbitrator that the District
would summarily terminate an otherwise excellent teacher for remarks, that he now
acknowledges were inappropriate, without making some effort to follow the progressive
discipline policy .... " Id. at 31.
213. Moreover, some states refuse to hire teachers who have suffered certificate
revocations in other states. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 231.28 (West 1998).
214. See Hearings on H.B. 49 Before the House Educ. Comm., Exhibit 9A at 1, 55th
Leg. Sess. (Mont. 1997) (statement of Michael Dahlem, private attorney).
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